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Abstract 
This study evaluates the impact of privatisation on efficiency and productivity of the Pakistani 
cement industry. To address some of the serious concerns about the problem  of dimension and 
outlier, we use a newly developed unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile estimator of Wheelock and 
Wilson to estimate efficiency (Wheelock D. C., and Wilson P. W., 2008, Non-parametric, 
unconditional quantile estimation for efficiency analysis with an application to Federal Reserve 
check processing operations, Journal of Econometrics, 209-225). Subsequently, we use these 
efficiency estimates to calculate the Malmquist productivity growth and its components. The 
results show that deregulation and privatisation had the desired positive effect on productivity 
growth due to technological progress. We conclude that this improvement in the post reform 
period could be linked to political stability, improved economic conditions and a competitive 
industry. 
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1. Introduction 
The privatisation wave of 1980s has encouraged research on testing the role of agency problems 
by comparing the performance of firms pre- and post change of ownership. A number of 
authors found that performance under private ownership was clearly superior. Others, however, 
suggested that performance was better under public sector management, or at least that public 
ownership did not impede efficiency. The two contrasting conclusions led to different policy 
recommendations in regard to the role of the state and management of public enterprises. There 
appear to be a number of reasons for this inconsistency. These include; the very short time spans 
and the small sample size used in these studies, lack of comparable firms and use of 
inappropriate methodologies.  
 
This study evaluates the impact of deregulation and privatisation on the efficiency and 
productivity of the Pakistani cement industry. To address the issue of comparability of decision 
making units (firms), we use a firm-level data set comprising different ownership types such as 
public, private and privatised, the firms all producing a homogeneous product and operating in a 
relatively competitive environment1. The short time-span sample issue is addressed by collecting 
and using twenty six years of data (1986 to 2011). Based on available published literature, we 
argue that our study is the first using two decades of post reform manufacturing firms’ data 
covering four to five business cycles. The results of this study should contribute significantly to 
the ongoing debate of the effect of reform on efficiency and productivity in developed countries 
as well as in the developing countries context.  
 
Broadly speaking, studies of the impact of privatisation on the performance of firms have used 
two methods. First; financial ratios, and secondly; estimation of efficiency and productivity via 
the production and/or cost function. Studies using the first method include: Megginson et al. 
[55], Villalonga [88], Harper [44], Boubakri and Cosset [16], Jackson et al. [49], Wei et al. [89], 
                                                 
1
 Whilst, there have been allegations of foul play and the formation of cartels since 2000, investigations by the State 
run competition commission suggest no such arrangements existed between cement producers.   
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Boubakri et al. [17], D’Souzaa et al. [32], Boubakri  et al. [18], Chen et al. [24], Mathur and 
Banchuenvijit [52], Farinós et al. [41], Naceur et al. [57], Cook and Uchida [28], Huanga and Yao 
[46], Huang and Wang [47], and Zhang et al. [97]2. The financial ratios methodology is simple, 
intuitive and easy to implement but is less preferred amongst some applied researchers. This is 
due to the non-parametric nature of the technique and being only a partial indicator of 
performance evaluation.  
 
The estimation of efficiency or productivity on the other hand, is considered a total indicator of 
performance evaluation3. Empirical research on the measurement of efficiency and productivity 
of a firm is expanding and increasingly becoming popular with governments, policy makers, 
management gurus and other key stakeholders. Some of the studies that use estimates of 
efficiency and/or productivity and compare firms performance in pre- and post-reform regimes 
include: Saal  and Parker [68], Rossi [67],  Sall and Parker [69,70]), Chirwa [25], Estache et al. [38], 
Jones and Mygind [50], Resende and Faceanha [64], Cullinane and Song [30], Li and Xu [51], 
Chirwa [26],Tongzon and Heng [85], Cullinane et al. [31], Brown et al. [21], Okten and Arin [61], 
Amess and Roberts [5], Sall et al. [71], Al-Obaidan [4] and Asaftei et al. [7]. Despite the fact that 
the measurement of productivity and efficiency has become common practice, with significant 
methodological development in the last few years’, debate on the appropriate estimator of 
efficiency and productivity is still inconclusive4.  
 
Two estimators of efficiency measurement are common vis-à-vis parametric stochastic error term 
regression models based on Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and mathematical linear 
                                                 
2 Some commonly used financial ratios include: return on sales/investment, value of real output, investment as a % 
total assets, cash ratios and dividend payout. These ratios are considered as a good starting point, but are insufficient to 
paint a complete picture as well as having issues with different accounting standards across the globe which makes 
international comparison difficult.     
3 Composite measure of performance is generally calculated by estimating relationship between input quantities, 
expenditures, prices and outputs. 
4
 See Wheelock and Wilson (88, 89) on the shortcoming of different non-parametric estimators. 
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programming based non-parametric estimator such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
Despite its statistical soundness, the SFA estimator is less straightforward when dealing with 
multiple outputs alongside assuming a priori functional forms (translog being the most flexible 
and commonly used5). In the case of DEA estimator, the common criticisms are first, it could 
produce unreliable inefficiency estimates due to extreme observations in the data, and second, 
the estimator suffers from the problem of dimensionality when using a small number of 
observations and a high number of inputs and outputs, resulting in more sample observations 
falling on the estimated frontier. In most empirical settings such as ours, the problem of 
dimensionality is serious issue which increases variance and produces larger confidence intervals. 
Hence, meaningful estimates would require researchers to use increasing amounts of data as the 
number of inputs is increased which are a typical feature of banking and manufacturing 
industries.     
 
Despite criticism, the use of the DEA to estimate efficiency and productivity has been on the 
rise, and in fact OMEGA’s volume 41 was dedicated to the discussion and the use of DEA in 
various settings. Subsequently, OMEGA alongside the European Journal of Operational 
Research remained at the forefront of publishing influential studies on the use of the DEA to 
estimate efficiency. These include Huang et al. [45] studying tourist hotels, Matthews [53] on 
banking, Hwang et al. [48] on the automobile industry, Rogge et al. [66] on solid waste collection 
and processing services, Tone and Tsutsui, [84] on US electric utilities, Collier et al. [27] on 
fisheries, Ray and Ghose [63] on agriculture farms, Doumpos and Cohen [37] on local 
government, Santos and Amado [72] on judicial systems, and Tüselmann et al. [87] on journal 
rankings. 
 
                                                 
5
 Authors such as McAllister and McManus, [56]; and Wheelock and Wilson, [90] noted that the translog technology is 
likely to mis-specify the banks cost relationship. Incorrect specification of the model nonetheless is more of a common 
feature in most of the empirical studies and thus would lead to less satisfactory root-n consistency. 
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Since the mid 1990s, there have been a number of developments in the examination of the 
properties of DEA estimator; for instance Simar and Wilson [76-83], Daraio and Simar [35], 
Daouia and Simar [34] and Wheelock and Wilson [89,90]. Wheelock and Wilson [89, 90] 
developed and used an unconditional α-quantile hyperbolic estimator to estimate efficiency and 
productivity. They concluded that their unconditional α-quantile hyperbolic estimator is robust, 
avoids the impact of an outlier, and produces reliable estimates even with fewer observations. 
Bruffaerts et al. [22] have also confirmed the robustness of the hyperbolic efficiency estimator. 
We have used this estimator to estimate efficiency and productivity and thus avoid the problem 
of the dimension and outlier effects typical of this type of study, mentioned above. We also use 
the other commonly used non-parametric estimators such as DEA, Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
and order-m alongside the limitation of each; to facilitate the comparison and to highlight the 
importance of using an appropriate estimator in estimating efficiency and productivity6. 
 
We find, on average, that firms in the post reform period have become less efficient in using their 
key resources (inputs). Most of this decrease in efficiency is occurred during the 1996 to 2007 
period. Efficiency did improve marginally between 2007 to 2011 but not sufficient enough to 
guarantee an overall improvement in the post reform period. Variations in the efficiency 
estimates across firms were high before reform was enacted, but relatively low in the post reform 
period since the late 1990s. The productivity story is equally interesting. Overall, firms 
experienced a productivity decline in the pre- reform period. This decline was largely due to a 
technological regress. For the post reform period, we find that firms experienced an 
improvement in productivity, mainly due to efficiency in the use of technology. 
   
The structure of this paper is such that the next section presents an overview of the Pakistani 
cement industry as well as a review of the reforms in the early and late 1990s. Section three 
provides an overview of the empirical literature on the impact of reform on efficiency and 
productivity. Section four covers the conceptual framework and estimation techniques of 
                                                 
6
 See section 3 for survey of literature and contrasting conclusions drawn from different estimators of efficiency. 
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efficiency and productivity. Data discussion, estimation results, analysis and conclusions are 
presented in sections five, six and seven respectively. 
 
2. Developments in the Pakistani cement industry 
Cement manufacturing is a well-established industry in Pakistan, accounting for about 5.5% of 
total industrial production, representing 1.4% of GDP and contributing 30 billion Pakistani 
Rupees annually to the National Exchequer. Cement manufacturing began in 1921 when 
Pakistan’s first plant was set up with a capacity of 44,500 tonnes per year (tpy). The industry 
grew steadily until independence in 1947. At this time, two companies with a total of four 
plants (all in the private sector) were in operation with a total capacity of 480,000 tpy.  During 
the 1950’s and 1960’s, six more plants were set up, four in the private sector and two in the 
public sector by the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC). The industry 
maintained a growth rate of 9.7% per annum during the 1960s.  By the end of 1971, the 
production capacity of cement had increased to 3.45 million tpy, with 58% in the public sector 
and 42% in the private sector, respectively. A socialist-leaning government nationalised the 
cement industry in January 1972 and all the cement plants were placed under the Board of 
Industrial Management (BOIM) and subsequently state run State Cement Corporation of 
Pakistan (SCCP). 
 
The first clear indication of the reversal of the nationalization policy came with the introduction 
of Martial Order in 1978 leading to the handing over of three cement manufacturing units to 
their previous owners7. The pro-industry/market orientated government of Nawaz Sharif sold a 
total of sixty six manufacturing industrial units and commercial banks to the private sector in 
1991-92. Since then, successive governments have been trying to sell public assets such as 
utilities and infrastructure such as airports, larger nationalized commercial banks and 
                                                 
7 After the government, sympathetic to a social agenda, was removed by the army, and martial-law was imposed in 
1977.   
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development financial institutions but were only able to privatise one power company and a 
13.2% equity stake of Pakistan Telecommunication Ltd (PTCL).  
 
The partial privatisation of cement manufacturing firms started earlier than the mass 
privatisation programme of 1991-92. SCCP sold part of two state run companies, worth 30 
million Rupees, in 1984 to the Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP). They later sold these 
assets on as part of mutual funds to private and institutional investors. In 1992, the government 
privatised 8 cement companies, 6 to established industrial groups and 2 to an “Employee 
Groups”. The privatisation process of some companies was completed in 1992 but payment 
and transfer of ownership was delayed due to courts cases and other administrative issues. Two 
of these privatisations were completed in 1996, and the military regime sold off the remaining 
two government-owned cement manufacturing units in 1999 and 2003. Since 2003, all the 
cement manufacturing firms have been operating under private sector ownership. On the eve 
of privatisation, the government implemented a golden handshake scheme for workers. The 
response by workers was positive, and some 20-30% of workers opted for the scheme. The 
industry is now comprised of two different types of firms namely; privatised and private firms. 
Private firms are a group of firms which were under private ownership throughout the period. 
Privatised firms comprised two types. The first type, are those firms that were privatised during 
mass privatisation of 1991, and the second type are those firms who were subsequently 
privatised.      
 
The privatisation programme in Pakistan has come under severe criticism partly due to the less 
than satisfactory performance of some privatised industrial units. This is despite the 
outstanding performances by other privatised firms. Successive governments have been trying 
to sell bigger companies such as the public railways and the national airline without success. 
Since the mid 1990s, immediately after privatisation, other new private cement firms also 
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entered the market and some firms of these have gone on to add significant capacities8. The 
number of firms in operation increased which led to increased competition particularly during 
the period 1995-6 to 2004-5. However, since 2007, the Herfindhal Index has reverted to pre- 
reform levels (see Figure 1). This decrease in competition could be explained by the merger of 
some smaller firms with the larger ones and the expansion of production capacities and total 
assets.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
3. The effect of privatisation and deregulation on efficiency and productivity-review of 
literature 
The privatisation wave of the 1980s fuelled the ongoing debate of the importance of comparing 
performance under new management and the evaluation of agency problems. The literature on 
the question of ownership change and performance has been informative but is not conclusive. 
For simplification, one could divide the 1980s and 1990s studies into two broader categories. The 
first is an analysis of the nature of ownerships and performance (private, public and mixed). The 
second addresses the issue of the firm’s performance in pre- and post-privatisation periods.  
 
In the first case, broadly speaking, two sets of conclusions have emerged. Authors such as 
Bennett and Johnson [13], Boardman and Vining [15], and Boycko et al. [20] found the 
performance under private ownership clearly superior. Authors such as Aharoni [2], Boardman 
and Vining [15], Atkinson and Halvorsen [8], and Naqvi and Kemal [58] concluded that 
performance was superior under the public sector management, or at least public ownership did 
not present a hurdle to the efficient operation. Early studies that supported the improvement in 
                                                 
8 The industry now employs 150,000 workforces directly or indirectly. Furthermore, industry has started exporting 
cement to neighbouring countries such as India and Afghanistan as well as Middle East, South Africa and other 
countries.   
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the post privatisation period include Bishop and Kay [14], Megginson et al. [55], Bousoffiane et al. 
[19], Galal et al. [42]9, Scully [74] and Plane [62].  
 
In the context of the Pakistani privatisation programme of manufacturing firms, there are 
remarkably, few studies10. Notable among them is the study by Aftab and Khan [1] who 
compared the pre- and post-privatisation record of five firms in three industries, where 
employees themselves and private firms purchased the units. This study finds that the private 
sector firms are more successful than the firms purchased by their employees. In general, private 
ownership results in less labour retrenchment. Naqvi and Kemal [59] concluded “the 
consequences of privatisation on efficiency, output and the price level have so far been uncertain, 
and there is enough evidence to suggest that this policy may have lowered the economy’s 
employment potential, worsened the conditions of workers and has led to greater concentration 
of income and wealth”. However, conclusions drawn from these studies could be somewhat 
misleading because only five years of post privatisation data were used in the study.  
 
Since the turn of the century (2000), significant effort has gone in to evaluating the performance 
of firms in the pre- and post privatisation periods (for a summary of these findings see Table 1.). 
Starting with the utility sector, privatisation of telecommunication, water and sewerage, and 
electricity and gas distribution firms in developed and developing countries has encouraged some 
authors to examine the effectiveness of change of ownership on efficiency and productivity. Saal 
and Parker [68, 69] concluded that economic efficiency improved post privatisation in the UK. 
Later on, Sall and Parker [70, 71] were unable to show any productivity improvement in the post 
privatisation period despite significant reductions in labour utilisation. Rossi [67] showed 
efficiency improvement, but Resende and Faceanha [64] documented no improvement in 
                                                 
9
 Galal et al. [42] is the first study that looked into case studies of cost-benefit analysis of privatisation of companies 
from across the world.  
10
 The reason includes the unavailability of data, lack of research culture in the country and slow progress in privatising 
of remaining public sector firms in the last 15 years. 
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efficiency in the post privatisation period. Li and Xu [51] concluded that privatisation and 
pressure of competition had a positive effect on labour and total factor productivity.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Analysing the effect of ownership change in the transportation sector produced some interesting 
conclusions. Estache et al. [38] documented an improvement in productivity after privatisation. 
The growth of total factor productivity (TFP) was due primarily to an improvement in output 
rather than a decrease in input use. Cullinane and Song [30] concluded that privatisation 
improved container productive efficiency in Korea. Involvement of the private sector had a 
positive effect on efficiency. Tongzon and Heng [85] using a stochastic frontier model showed 
private participation improved port operation efficiency and competitiveness. Cullinane et al. [31] 
rejected the proposition that greater private sector involvement in the container port sector 
would lead to improved efficiency.  
 
A significant number of studies have also assessed the impact of privatisation and deregulation 
on manufacturing sector operations. Chirwa [25] concluded the higher technical efficiency of 
Malawian privatised, state-owned and private ownership companies for the period 1970-97. 
Saygili and Taymaz [73] using Turkish cement firms observed that privatisation and change of 
ownership had no effect on technical efficiency. Jones and Mygind [50] documented a positive 
effect of the change of ownership. Private firms were more efficient and productive as compared 
to state-owned firms. Chirwa [26] reported high mean technical efficiency in privatised, 
competing state owned and private companies. Brown et al. [21] documented an immediate and 
long term positive effect of privatisation on productivity for three countries (Romania, Hungary, 
and Ukraine), but a negative effect for Russia. Okten and Arin [61] evaluated productive and 
allocative efficiency of twenty two Turkish privatised cement companies for the period 1983-99. 
The study concluded that ownership change does in itself promote labour productivity. Amess 
and Roberts [5] concluded that Polish producer cooperative firms improved their productivity in 
the first three years of the post privatisation period by a range of 3-20%. Asaftei et al. [7] 
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concluded that ownership change was not sufficient to guarantee a significant improvement in 
productivity of Romanian manufacturing firms. Privatised firms did not perform any better than 
public enterprises.  
 
It could be stated that although there exists a vast body of literature on public-private efficiency 
comparison and the effect of privatisation itself on firms’ performance, it is not conclusive. The 
contribution of this study could be summarised in the following points:  
 
1. By looking at table 1, a similar study comparable to ours that uses the same non-
parametric method to determine the efficiency of a developing country’s manufacturing 
industry after deregulation and privatisation is by Chirwa [25]. The Chirwa study 
however does not address the fundamental problems of the dimension and poor 
convergence rate due to its small numbers of observations. We intend to address this by 
using the partial frontier that is robust to outliers, is consistent, and converge even with a 
small number of observations.  
 
2. Studies that looked at the manufacturing sector performance and have probably 
captured a significant number of business cycles include Saygili and Taymaz [73] [sixteen 
years], Chirwa [26] [twenty years], Bartel and Harrison [11] [fifteen years] and Okten and 
Arin [61] [seventeen years]. Our study uses twenty years of data on inputs and outputs of 
the Pakistani cement industry which has evolved over time and has become significant in 
terms of export earnings (Pakistan now being the world’s fifth largest cement exporter) 
and contributes 30 billion Rupees to the National Exchequer.  
 
3. Most of the studies summarised in table 1 looked at the firm’s performance by 
estimating efficiency or productivity i.e. Chirwa [25] [efficiency], Saygili and Taymaz [73] 
[efficiency], Chirwa [26] [efficiency], Bartel and Harrison [11] [productivity], Brown et al. 
[21] [productivity], Okten and Arin [61] [productivity], Amess and Roberts [5] 
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[productivity]. A study that evaluated productivity as well as efficiency is by Jones and 
Mygind [50] but used only five years data and a parametric approach that is subject to 
criticism due to its dependence on a priori functional form. We intend to address these 
issues by using more than two and half decades of data and non-parametric methods to 
assess firms’ performance in terms of efficiency as well as productivity.  
 
4. Studies that addressed the issue of privatisation/deregulation and firms’ performance 
since 2000 and summarised in table 1, are limited to either developed countries such as 
UK, BRICS countries or countries at the advanced stage of their economic development 
(South Korea, Argentina, Turkey and Indonesia). All these countries have a relatively 
stable political system, established property rights and a good industrial base. Pakistan 
being an underdeveloped country, having extremely low per capita income, political 
instability (government has changed five times since the first phase of the privatisation 
program) provides an interesting laboratory and hopefully should be a good case study 
when it comes to the analysis of the impact of change of ownership on a firm’s 
productivity and efficiency.  
 
In the following section, we describe efficiency estimators and show how we used these to 
estimate efficiency and productivity. 
4. Methodology 
In presenting our methodology to estimate efficiency and productivity we follow Wheelock and 
Wilson [89, 90] to define a family of non-parametric estimators and our notations, conventions, 
definitions and procedures are similar to their studies. We briefly discuss each estimator alongside 
its limitations11. We first start with familiar and widely used FDH and DEA estimators and then 
extend our discussion to more recent and advance estimators such as order-m, α-quantile and our 
preferred hyperbolic order-α quantile estimator. In the subsequent analysis, we use cross time 
                                                 
11 For detailed discussion on the development, properties, functionality and limitations of different non-parametric 
estimators see Wheelock and Wilson [89, 90].   
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period hyperbolic efficiency estimates to estimate the Malmquist productivity index and its 
components.  
 
Let us assume firms used input quantities (p) to produce output quantities (q) and standard 
production possibility set compatible with micro economic theory as 𝒑𝑡 ≡ {(𝑥, 𝑦)|𝑥 can produce 
𝑦 at time t} ⊂  ℝ+
𝑝+𝑞
, where input and output vectors are represented by p input quantities as 
𝑥 ∈ ℝ+
𝑝
 x ∈ R+
p
and q output quantities as 𝑦 ∈ ℝ+
𝑞
. This set is representative of a feasible 
combination of input and output at a given point of time and could vary over time. 𝒑𝑡𝜕in this 
framework, could represent an upper boundary of production frontier (benchmark) 𝒑𝑡. Firms 
observed performance in terms of input or output compared against this benchmark. The 
traditional practice is to estimate distance from an arbitrary point (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ℝ+
𝑝+𝑞
 to the boundary 
𝒑𝑡𝜕along a particular direction (minimise inputs use (input orientation/direction) or maximise 
output (output orientation)). The input and output distance functions of Shephard [75] are 
defined: 
𝜃(𝑥, 𝑦|𝒑𝑡) ≡ sup{𝜃 > 0|(𝜃−1𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝒑𝑡}  (1) 
𝜆(𝑥, 𝑦|𝒑𝑡) ≡ inf {𝜆 > 0|(𝑥, 𝜆−1) ∈  𝒑𝑡}        (2) 
The input distance function (1) above measures the distance from ( ,x y ) to 𝒑𝑡𝜕in a direction 
orthogonal to output vector 𝑦, and output distance function (2) to input vector 𝑥. Under the 
constant return to scale (CRS), the output distance function is simply a reciprocal of input 
distance function 𝜃(𝑥, 𝑦|𝒑𝑡) = (𝑥, 𝑦|𝒑𝑡)−1. However, the variable returns to scale (VRS) imply 
that the choice of orientation (input or output) could have serious consequences for efficiency 
estimates due to the heterogeneity in the size of the firms12. Färe et al. [39] addressed the issue of 
orientation and measured the distance along a hyperbolic path from a fixed point (𝑥, 𝑦) to 𝒑𝑡𝜕as: 
𝛾(𝑥, 𝑦|𝒑𝑡) ≡ sup{𝛾 > 0 |(𝛾−1𝑥, 𝛾𝑦) ∈  𝒑𝑡}   (3) 
                                                 
12 Large size firms are likely to be more efficient compared to small size firms if the output direction is chosen and vice 
versa.   
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γ(x, y|P) ≡ sup {γ > 0|(γ-1x, γy)} ∈ PThe above unknown true distance function of 
production set 𝒑𝑡is estimated from a set 𝓈𝓃 = {𝑥i, 𝑦𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛  of actual input/output combination of 
sample firms. Later on, at the estimation stage, the unknown true 𝒑𝑡 is replaced with an estimator 
of the production set to obtain an estimator of distance function. Deprins et al. [36] proposed a 
free disposal hull (FDH) of the observations in 𝒮𝑛𝑡
𝑡  as: 
?̃?(𝒮𝑛𝑡
𝑡 ) = ⋃ {(x, y) ∈ ℝ+
p+q
(𝑥𝑖,𝑦𝑖)∈𝒮𝑛𝑡
𝑡
 |y ≤ yi, x ≥ 𝑥i}   (4) 
Assuming variable returns to scale (VRS), the DEA estimator is obtained by replacing 𝒑𝒕with the 
convex hull of ?̃?(𝓢𝒏𝒕
𝒕 ): 
?̂?𝐷𝐸𝐴
𝒕 (𝒮𝑛𝑡
𝑡 ) = {(x, y) ∈ ℝ+
p+q
| y ≤ ∑i
n
i=1
yi , x ≥ ∑ixi, ∑i
n
i=1
n
i=1
= 1,i ≥ 0 ∀i= 1, … , n}  (5)  
 
DEA and FDH estimates of input or output distance function are obtained by linear 
programming and numerical methods. So, in a way DEA and FDH estimators are the same with 
just one difference that the DEA estimator assumes that the production set is convex. The 
measure defined in (1,2,3) provides a measure of the technical efficiency of sample firms using 
input output combination at time t. The convex cone 𝒱(?̂?𝐷𝐸𝐴
𝑡 ) is estimated by dropping the  
constraint ∑ i = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1  in (5) and provides estimates of 𝒱(𝒑
𝑡) and is restricted to only constant 
returns to scale. 
  
A good deal of progress has been made so far to establish asymptotic properties of the DEA and 
FDH estimator. However, both estimators suffer from serious problems such as the 
dimensionality and outlier effect, which make the inefficiency estimates derived from these 
estimators less reliable. It has been established that due to the problem of dimensionality, the 
DEA and FDH estimator convergence rates are extremely slow. For example the DEA VRS 
estimator converges at the rate n−2/(𝑝+𝑞+1) and FDH n−1/(𝑝+𝑞), where n is the number of 
decision making units (DMU). In a case, where firms are producing a single output using four 
inputs, one would require many more observations compared to firms using a single input to 
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produce single output to obtain the convergence of the DEA and FDH estimator and resulting 
in statistically unreliable inefficiency estimates. Hence, results derived from the estimators such as 
DEA and FDH are biased downward or upward13. Wheelock and Wilson [92] noted that any 
study with one hundred to two hundred observations and five to ten dimensions is likely to 
produce statistically less than satisfactory results. Hence, in a nutshell, DEA and FDH estimators 
could produce statistically misleading efficiency estimates due to outliers, a low convergence rate 
and an arbitrary choice of input and output orientation. The first and second issues are addressed 
by use of order-α and order-m estimators. The last issue could be avoided by choosing a 
hyperbolic distance function.  
 
Recently, to address those issues discussed above, based on the notion of the partial frontier 
rather than the entire envelope, a new generation of estimators have been developed and used 
such as “order-m” and “order- quantile estimator”14.  
 
Order-m estimators15 
Cazals et al. [23] developed order-m estimators that do not require the convexity assumption, is 
root-n consistent and does not suffer due to a high dimension of inputs and output. In addition,  
being constructed on a partial rather than a full boundary it is not affected by outliers. By 
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 The issue of extreme observations could be addressed by using parametric estimator based on the idea of estimating 
a composite error response function with the error term based on the idea of Aigner et al. [3] and Meeusen and Broeck 
[54]. Theoretical research  has proved that in the case of extreme heterogeneity in the sample, translog functional form 
can lead to misspecification of the model and produces unreliable efficiency estimates (example of such studies 
highlighting this issue are Cooper and Mclaren [29], Banks et al. [9], Wheelock and Wilson [90] and Wilson and Carey 
[95]. Wheelock and Wilson [92] noted that the extension of translog functional form does not guarantee robust 
estimates. 
14
 For details of these estimators see Cazal et al. [23] for “order-m” estimator and Daouia [33], Aragan et al. [6] and 
Daouia and Simar [34] for conditional “order-” and unconditional hyperbolic “order-” quantile and Wheelock and 
Wilson [93] for hyperbolic order-α quantile estimator.  
 
15
 Most of the mathematical notations and formulation for this estimator are taken from Cazal et al. [23].    
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following Wheelock and Wilson [91], we start with the output oriented distance function based 
on a random draw of m output vectors subject to given inputs. The random distance function 
similar to (2) could be written as: 
𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦|𝐴𝑚
𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦)) ≡ 𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝜃 > 0|(𝑥, 𝑦/𝜃) ∈ 𝐴𝑚
𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦)}    (6) 
Depending upon a random draw of m output vectors, for any fixed input level say 𝑥0, 𝐴𝑚
𝑡 (𝑥0), is 
random. For any ∈ ℝ+
𝔮
 , expected maximum output level of order m for 𝑥 is defined in such a 
way that 𝑓𝑥
𝑡(𝑥) = 𝑓𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦)/𝑓𝑡(𝑦|𝑥) > 0 and 𝑦𝑚
𝑡𝜕(𝑥) ≡ 𝑦/Ε[𝐷(𝑥, 𝑦|𝐴𝑚
𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦))] 
 
The order-m proxy of 𝒑𝑡is defined as: 
𝒑𝑚
𝑡 ≡ {(𝑥, 𝑦)|(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝒑𝑡 , 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦𝑚
𝑡𝜕(𝑥)}     (7) 
 
Wheelock and Wilson [91] denoted the closure of the complement of 𝒑𝑚
𝑡  as  𝒑𝑚
𝑡𝜕 and termed this 
as an order-m frontier. Under this approach, the observed output quantity of a firm is compared 
to what could be expected from any m randomly chosen firms that do not use more input 
quantities than the firm in question. A simple Monte Carlo technique developed by Cazals et al. 
[23] could be used to estimate maximum feasible output of chosen m random firms, and then the 
firm’s performance could be compared against this benchmark. Similar to an order-m output 
frontier, the order-m input frontier at input level 𝑥0 is estimated as: 
𝒑𝑚
𝜕 (𝑥0) ≡ Ε[max(𝑦1, … . , 𝑦𝑚) | 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥0]     (8) 
When it comes to choosing the value of m as trimming parameter, one could choose different 
values such as five, ten, fifty, hundred or more of representative firms. Due to the small number 
of firms each year, we choose m=5 in our empirical estimation of order-m output/ input 
orientation efficiency estimates.   
 
Hyperbolic order-α quantile estimator 
As far as the development of a quantile estimator is concerned, Wheelock and Wilson [92] 
defined a statistical model with assumptions, such as: 
i. Production setP 𝒑𝑡is compact and free disposal. 
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ii. Sample observations 𝒮𝑛𝑡
𝑡 = {(𝑥i, 𝑦i)}i=1
n
 are the realisation of identically 
independently distributed (iid) random variables with a probability density 
function 𝑓𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦)  with support over 𝒑𝑡. Any point (𝑥, 𝑦) can be said to be 
on the frontier ofP, lets say 𝒑𝑡𝜕, if {(𝛾−1𝑥, 𝛾𝑦)} ∉ 𝒑𝑡  for any 𝛾 > 1. 
iii. It is assumed that at the frontier, the density f t  is strictly positive and 
sequentially lipschitz continuous.   
 
Following Wheelock and Wilson [93] pp.357, the density function 𝑓𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦) above implies a 
probability function:  
𝐻𝑡(𝑥0, 𝑦0) =  𝑃𝑟(𝑥 ≤ 𝑥0, 𝑦 ≥ 𝑦0 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡)   (9)  
 
The above function provides the probability of drawing an observation from 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)  that weakly 
dominates the DMU operating at (𝑥0, 𝑦0). The idea of dominance here implies that firms should 
be compared in terms of their similarity in the use of input mix and output production. Rather 
than estimating the efficiency by imposing input or output orientation, a hyperbolic approach 
maintains a link with the concept of dominance (for details on this, see Wheelock and Wilson 
[93] pp. 357).  
 
(x0, y0)Now using 𝐻( , ), the hyperbolic distance function can be written as: 
𝛾𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦|𝒑𝑡) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝{𝛾 > 0|𝐻(𝛾−1𝑥, 𝛾𝑦) > 0}  (10) 
The hyperbolic -quantile distance function can be defined as: 
𝛾𝛼
𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝{𝛾 > 0|𝐻𝑡(𝛾−1𝑥, 𝛾𝑦) > (1 − 𝛼)}  (11) 
The hyperbolic -quantile frontier is defined as: 
𝒑𝛼
𝑡𝜕 = {𝛾𝛼
𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦)−1𝑥, 𝛾𝛼
𝑡(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑦|(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝒑𝑡}    (12) 
 
For an estimation of 𝜸𝜶
𝒕 (𝒙, 𝒚) and corresponding 𝒑𝜶
𝒕𝝏 for the observations in 𝓢𝒏𝒕
𝒕 Pα
∂, the 
empirical analogue of equation (9) is defined as: 
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Η̂𝑛(𝑥0, 𝑦0|𝒮nt
t ) =  𝑛𝑡
−1 ∑ Ι(𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑥0, 𝑦𝑖  ≥ 𝑦0|(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖) ∈ 𝒮nt
t )
𝑛
𝑖=1
   (13) 
Ĥn(x0, y0) = n
-1 ∑ I(ni=1 xi ≤ x0, yi ≥ y0)with Ι(∙) as an indicator function. Now, the estimator 
of 𝜸𝜶
𝒕 (𝒙, 𝒚) is obtained by replacing Η(∙,∙) with ?̂? ( , |𝓢𝐧𝐭𝐭 ) to achieve the following:  
𝛾𝛼,𝑛𝑡
𝑡 (𝑥, 𝑦) =  𝑠𝑢𝑝{𝛾 > 0|Η̂𝑛( 𝛾
−1𝑥, 𝛾𝑦|𝒮nt
t ) > (1 − 𝛼)}   (14) 
 
Wheelock and Wilson [92] stated that the computation of γ̂α,nt
t (x, y) becomes a univariate issue 
and the estimator of the input/output conditional α-quantile distance function can be achieved 
with small error. Given a point, (x0, y0), one can find initial values 𝛾𝑎, 𝛾𝑏 that would bracket the 
solution so that  (Η̂n(γa
−1𝓍0, γay0|𝒮nt
t ) < (1 − α) and (Η̂n(γb
−1𝓍0, γby0|𝒮nt
t ) < (1 − α), then 
solve for 𝛾𝛼,𝑛(𝑥0, 𝑦0) using the bisection method. Wheelock and Wilson [93] tested the 
properties of this estimator and concluded that (1) the estimator is strongly consistent and 
asymptotically normally distributed and converge at the classical parametric root-n rate. The 
choice of α in estimating the efficiency estimates using the hyperbolic quantile estimator is an 
important decision. We experimented with different values but to conserve space we report 
results only for α = 0.9 in our empirical section. We use the Wilson [94] FEAR library routines to 
use a family of non-parametric estimators to estimate efficiency of cement manufacturing firms.        
 
Malmquist Productivity Index 
Similar to Wheelock and Wilson [93], efficiency change over two time periods is calculated by the 
ratio 𝛾𝛼
𝑡2(𝑥𝑖𝑡2, 𝑦𝑖𝑡2)/𝛾𝛼
𝑡1(𝑥𝑖𝑡1, 𝑦𝑖𝑡1). A value of less than unity would imply an increase in the 
technical efficiency in the current period (t1) compared to the reference period (t2) relative to α-
quantiles at time t1 and t2. An industry level performance measure of efficiency change is 
computed by the geometric mean of this ratio. For a quantile based measure of efficiency, the 
change in efficiency between two time periods t1 and t2 is calculated as:   
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ℰ𝛼(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = [ ∏
𝛾𝛼
𝑡2(𝑥𝑖𝑡2, 𝑦𝑖𝑡2)
𝛾𝛼
𝑡1(𝑥𝑖𝑡1, 𝑦𝑖𝑡1)
𝑖∈ T (𝑡1,𝑡2)
]
1
# T (𝑡1,𝑡2)
    (15) 
Where ℇ𝛼(𝑡1, 𝑡2) are the mean change in efficiency between time periods t1 and t2, relative to the 
unconditional, hyperbolic α-quantile at time t1 and t2. Whereas (t1, t2) is the set of firms in 
existence in both time periods and # T (𝑡1, 𝑡2) is the number of firms in the set.  
 
Malmquist productivity index, a dynamic measure of productivity index proposed by Färe et al. 
[40] between two time periods t1 and t2 is calculated by first estimating Shephard input, output or 
hyperbolic path distance functions by using estimators such as DEA, FDH, ORDERM and 
unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile. Malmquist productivity index is defined as16:  
Μ𝛼(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = {[∏
𝛾((𝑥𝑖𝑡2,𝑦𝑖𝑡2| V (𝒑𝛼
𝑡1))
𝛾((𝑥𝑖𝑡1,𝑦𝑖𝑡1| V (𝒑𝛼
𝑡1))𝑖∈ T
(𝑡1,𝑡2)
×
𝛾((𝑥𝑖𝑡2,𝑦𝑖𝑡2| V (𝒑𝛼
𝑡2))
𝛾((𝑥𝑖𝑡1,𝑦𝑖𝑡1| V (𝒑𝛼
𝑡2))
]
1 2⁄
}
1
# T (𝑡1,𝑡2)
(16)  
This index measures the mean (geometric) change in the productivity of firms from time t1 to t2 
due to either efficiency change (the first component in equation (16)) or technological progress 
(the second component in equation (16)). As highlighted by Wheelock and Wilson [93], this 
measure is similar in term of composition, but differs in two ways to Färe et al. [40]. First, 
productivity is benchmarked between convex cone boundaries of α-quantile and second, 
hyperbolic direction is used rather than the input or output to avoid issues highlighted in the 
above discussion. Μ𝛼(𝑡1, 𝑡2) <1 would indicate a productivity increase and Μ𝛼(𝑡1, 𝑡2) >1 
corresponds to productivity decline. 
 
5. Data 
We employ a panel data set, for the period 1986 to 2011. This study period represents four to 
five business cycles and would provide a comprehensive picture of trends and adjustments in 
                                                 
16 For detail see Wheelock and Wilson, [93], pp 361. 
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input use and production in the pre- and post deregulation/privatisation period. Output and 
input variables in current prices are deflated by the relevant indices to arrive at a constant price 
for output and inputs. We approximate the firm’s output by total gross sales and real output is 
worked out by deflating the nominal sales by the cement price index17. The inputs used in our 
study are labour18, fixed capital19, fuel and energy expenditures20 and a residual category of 
expenditures on raw and packing material21. Real values of fixed capital, fuel expenses and raw 
material are calculated by deflating these accounts by the GDP deflator, fuel price index and raw 
material price index.  
 
A continuous data series on the number of workers was not available for privatised and private 
firms for the period 1986 to 1996. For this purpose, we used information from detailed 
meetings with the All Pakistan Cement Manufacturer Association, World Bank [96] study, 
Privatisation Commission of Pakistan, Former Expert Advisory Cell (various publications) and 
Government of Pakistan [43]. For the privatised firms, a complete set of data was made 
available while these firms were under public ownership. For the period 1992-6 immediately 
after these firms were privatised, we were unable to collect information on workforce strength. 
To fill this gap, we gathered data on the number of workers who opted for a golden handshake 
at the time of privatisation. Bengali [12], in a study of eight privatised industrial enterprises, 
including two cement firms, notes that approximately 25% of the workers who opted for the 
                                                 
17 
Our output variable is in values rather than quantity and is similar to Bandyopadhyay [10] and Tsckouras and Skuras 
[86]. 
18 
Some authors used total man-days instead of number of workers. We do not have access to this data. Further, due to 
the law and order situation in Pakistan and strikes. Using total man days proxy would be misleading. Our measure is 
similar to Riccardi et al [65]. 
19
 Net fixed capital is used to capture the use of technology. Our measure is similar to Bandyopadhyay [10]. 
20 
Fuel and energy is an important input and accounts for more than 50% of the cost of production. We follow Saygili 
and Taymaz [73] in this regard and include this in our inputs combination. 
21 This measure is similar to Saygili and Taymaz [73] and accounts for more than 18% of cost of production. 
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golden handshake scheme were retained as contract employees. Detailed interviews with the 
new management confirmed this conclusion.  Hence, for the missing years 1992-6, the number 
of workers for privatised firm is calculated as a total number of workers at the time of 
privatisation minus numbers of workers who opted for the golden handshake + 25% of 
reinstated workers. For private firms, we have three data points: 1986, 1991 and 1996. The 
calculation of the remaining years is: 1986 figure  % annual average change during 1986-91 
and 1991-6 intervals. Data are available for all firms on this variable from 1997 onward, with 
some gaps. These gaps were filled by using missing values imputation methods wherever 
needed. Thus, the series on the numbers of workers calculated in this way is at best an 
appropriate measure on the workforce strength. 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of inputs and output in our study. By looking at the table it 
is apparent that we have a heterogeneous sample of firms. The total number of observations for 
the whole sample period after excluding a small number of outliers is 407 with an average 
number of roughly fifteen to sixteen firms per year. In estimating our yearly efficiency 
estimates, we are likely to encounter the problem of dimension due to a higher number of 
inputs (four) and an output. We hope to address this by using an unconditional α-quantile 
hyperbolic estimator which is robust, consistent, and deals with the low number of 
observations better. 
         [Table 2 about here] 
 
6. Empirical findings  
First we present estimates of technical efficiency derived through the traditional FDH and 
DEA estimators (Table 3); using a freely available statistical program “FEAR” written by 
Wilson [94]22. We estimated the efficiency scores for each year of the sample for all firms using 
that year’s production frontier. We present and discuss both input and output oriented 
                                                 
22 We are grateful to Professor Wilson for replying to our queries regarding implementation of the hquan routine in the 
FEAR platform.  
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estimates and contrast these with hyperbolic estimates for the industry overall, over different 
time periods23. Starting with the FDH estimates of both input and output orientation, efficiency 
scores are almost identical to unity and as per expectation in both the pre- and post reform 
period indicating inefficiency to be almost zero with no change in post reform period. Very 
high efficiency scores could be misleading, and does support the fact that most of the sample 
firms lie close to the estimated frontier due to the high dimension of inputs space (four in our 
cases). The DEA estimates show approximately 3% technical inefficiency in pre- reform years 
(1986-91) and 6% in the post reform years (1992-2011), irrespective of input/output 
orientation, with inefficiency going up on average, from 3% to 6% in the post reform period. 
By subdividing post reform periods, one could suggest that most of this increase in inefficiency 
has occurred during the immediate period of privatisation (1992-98). The more recent years 
(2007-11) show some improvement in inefficiency compared to the period 1992-98, but no 
change compared to the pre- reform period. The DEA hyperbolic estimates almost support this 
conclusion with the estimates of efficiency marginally different to the DEA input/output 
orientation estimates (firms experiencing almost 2% inefficiency in the pre- and post reform 
period). The change in inefficiency when using DEA estimators could be due to the imposition 
of the convexity assumption rather than an accurate representation of inefficiency estimates.      
         [Table 3 about here] 
 
Next, we discuss the efficiency estimates using a partial frontier (order-m) for input and output 
orientation24. In the input orientation case, a value of distance estimate more than unity suggests 
the firms used more than the expected minimum. Whereas an input distance estimate less than 
unity indicates that the firms used less than the expected minimum. Looking at Table 3 column 
                                                 
23 We use a geometric mean in our calculation of efficiency scores over different time intervals in both pre- and post 
reform period.  
24
 We present and discuss our order-m estimates based on trimming parameter m=5. We also experimented with m=4 
and present these estimates in Appendix A. Despite the fact that estimates change; broader conclusions regarding 
trends over time remained the same.  
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“ORDERMi”, technical efficiency did not change in the post reform period. For the output 
oriented order-m efficiency estimates in column “ORDERMo” a score larger than one indicates 
that the firms produce more than the expected maximum amount from its observed inputs. A 
score of less than one means that the firm produces less than its expected maximum. The output 
oriented order-m efficiency estimates show that efficiency declined in post reform period. This 
decline is 20% over the full post reform years and 10% during the years 2007- 2011. Thus, the 
decrease in efficiency appears to be higher, compared to the DEA frontier estimates. 
 
The DEA and FDH estimates could be questionable due to the small sample size and slow 
convergence rates. In the next step, to obtain meaningful estimates, with a root-n convergence 
rate without imposing the convexity assumption with the DEA, we used an unconditional -
quantile estimator and reached some interesting conclusions. The input oriented technical 
efficiency estimates indicate roughly a 10% reduction in technical efficiency in the post reform 
period. This decline is approximately 3% for the period 1992-8. The output oriented technical 
efficiency estimates improved in the post reform period. This increase is 2.5%, 4% and 11.6% 
during 1992 to 2011, 1999 to 2011 and 2007 to 2011 retrospectively 25. Our preferred hyperbolic 
estimator reveals a more interesting story. We estimate that, on average in the pre-reform period, 
firms used just 57% of the input quantity and produced 1.8 times output (1/0.5685) than a firm 
(perhaps hypothetical) located on α=0.9 quantile frontier along a hyperbolic path. In the post 
reform period, firms used 71% of the input and produced 1/0.71 = 1.4 times more output than a 
firm located on α=0.9 quantile frontier along a hyperbolic path. Hence, based on these estimates, 
we conclude that firms on average became less efficient in the post reform period26. 
                                                 
25 These contradictory results indicate the importance of the choice of orientation in estimating efficiency of firms. In 
most of the studies we reviewed, the authors made arbitrary decisions in regard to the choice of orientation and 
subsequently tried to justify their choice with some success. Hence, it proves the point that it would be preferable to 
choose the hyperbolic estimator to avoid bias at the estimation stage.     
26
 Our above discussion is based on α value equal to 0.9. We also experimented with α value of 0.8, 0.85, and 0.87. 
These estimates are presented in Appendix A. Estimates do change due to the relatively small population of our 
cement firms; but broader conclusions of the impact of reform are almost same.  
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Figure 2 displays the industry trend of unconditional hyperbolic α-quantile efficiency estimates 
alongside the variance. We present the average, median and geometric mean of efficiency 
estimates. By looking at the figure, the geometric mean shows that during 1986-95, efficiency was 
stagnant, then from 1996 onwards until 2007, efficiency decreased contrary to expectations. 
Efficiency did improve marginally during 2007 to 2011, but not sufficient enough to guarantee an 
overall improvement in the post reform period. Qualitatively, the average efficiency trends report 
the same story irrespective of the method. Variations in efficiency estimates measured by the 
variance of the hyperbolic graph efficiency estimates, could give an indication of firms working 
to achieve uniformity in operations. Variations across the firms were relatively high before 
reform and in the initial years of the post reform period but remained relatively low in the post 
reform period from 1997 onward. 
         [Figure 2 about here] 
 
The industry trends of technical efficiency tell a fascinating story, but are unable to provide an 
indication of what happened to firms belonging to different ownership categories (public, private 
and privatised). Next, we stratified firms as per their ownerships and then calculated the 
geometric means of efficiency scores for each time period. The results of this exercise are 
depicted in Figure 3. The first group consists of those firms privatised in 1991-2 and are labelled 
‘privatised’. We follow these firms in both periods (pre- and post privatisation). The next 
category consists of those firms who were in the private sector in pre- privatisation years and 
remained so in the post reform period (labelled as ‘private’). The third category (labelled ‘public’) 
consists of those firms who were pure public sector firms (government owned) until they were 
privatised either in 1991-92 or subsequently afterwards.  
 
Figure 3 reveals that firms that were privatised in 1992 did not show any change in efficiency in 
the pre- reform period except in 1986. When it comes to the post reform period, technical 
efficiency declined during the period 1993 to 2007, but since 2007, these firms show a slight 
improvement in efficiency. Nonetheless, these firms witnessed an overall reduction of 8-9% in 
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their technical efficiency between 1992 and 2011. Private sector firms did experience some 
improvement in efficiency immediately after the reform. During the period 1996 to 2002, these 
firms did not do so well and faced a significant reduction in efficiency, but their efficiency has 
been flat since. Overall, these firms experienced a 4% decrease in efficiency in the post reform 
period. Public sector firms saw a positive response in the immediate post reform period. But 
since 1995, the firms’ performance has remained stable and experienced no change in efficiency.  
         [Figure 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents the geometric means of Malmquist productivity estimates alongside its 
components27. We present estimates for the overall industry and by ownerships. Mean values of 
less than 1 indicates an increase in productivity and greater than 1 indicates a decrease in 
productivity. Looking at the trend, firms experienced a productivity decline (2%) in the pre- 
reform period with the exception of 1988. During the post reform period, firms experienced a 
decline during only 4 years of the 20 year period, whereas, overall, 2.1% per annum growth in 
productivity was achieved by the industry in the post reform period (1992-2011). The year 2007 
seems to be an exceptional year whereby productivity declined by 14.6%, due to the political 
uncertainty and elections within Pakistan. If we exclude 2007 from the post reform period, then 
the gains in productivity are higher (annual 2.9% during 1992-2011 and 4.4% growth per annum 
during 1999 to 2011).            
 
Next, we examine the sources of productivity improvement/decline by efficiency and technology 
change (movement in α-quantile frontier). First, by looking at the pre-reform period, we get the 
impression that the decline in productivity in the pre- reform period was not largely due to a 
                                                 
27
 We present and discuss our main productivity estimates and its components using a hyperbolic quantile estimator 
discussed in the methodology section with α = 0.9. Due to the arbitrary choice of α and our respected reviewers’ 
suggestion, we also experimented with α = 0.8. These estimates are provided in Appendix B. As expected, due to fewer 
firms in each years’ sample, there are some changes in the estimates, but broader conclusions in term of trends and the 
impact of reforms (positive/negative) remained the same.    
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decrease in efficiency but to technological regress28 (out of a total 2% decline, 0.6% was 
contributed by a decrease in efficiency and 1.4% by a change in technology). We also calculated 
these estimates by ownerships. For firms that were privatised in 1991-2, a reduction of 3.5% in 
productivity was entirely due to a negative contribution of efficiency change. Technology actually 
improved, albeit marginally, for these firms during this time period. Results for technological 
improvement for this group of firms are not surprising, given the fact that majority of these firms 
were relatively new with modern technology (dry process of production). Firms already in the 
private sector experienced nearly a 10% decline in productivity and both sources contributed 
equally (efficiency change -3.5% and technology -6.1%). This is interesting as 4 private firms 
operating during this period were relatively new and small sized compared to firms in the public 
sector. Public sector firms, not privatised in the initial phase and privatised subsequently in late 
1990s and early 2000s, on the other hand, did not experience any change in productivity during 
1986-91. 
           [Table 4 about here] 
 
For the post reform period, we observe, that industry experienced an improvement in 
productivity due to the improvements in technology (out of a total 2.1% increase, 1.6% was the 
contribution by change in technology and 0.5% in efficiency29). For privatised firms, a 1.6% 
increase in productivity30 was due to a nominal positive contribution of efficiency (0.6%) and 
                                                 
28 Our results of pre- privatisation productivity decline are consistent with Amess and Roberts [5] who estimated a 1% 
productivity decline of Polish producer cooperatives.     
29 Improvement in technology is similar to Saal et al. [71]) who estimated a productivity decline post privatisation due 
to the efficiency decline despite technological improvements. Very low and insignificant contribution of efficiency 
improvement is similar to Rossi [67], Resende and Facanha [64] and Saygili and Taymaz [73] in assessing the impact of 
privatisation on the gas distribution in Argentina, telecommunication in Brazil and cement industry in Turkey. In all 
these studies the authors were unable to find the evidence that privatisation improves efficiency.  
30 Gains in productivity in post privatisation are similar to Estache et al. [38]. Improvement in productivity, in the post 
privatisation period, is also similar to Cullinane and Song [29] study of South Korean port terminal privatisation. 
Increases in productivity, post privatisation, is encouraging but contrary to Saal and Parker [70] who estimated a 
decline in productivity in the England and Wales water and sewerage provision by using quality adjusted TFP during 
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change in technology (2.2%)31. The results for the technological improvements are not surprising 
given the fact that these firms were relatively new in the pre-reform period, but had enough 
experience between 1992 and 2011. Firms already in the private sector experienced nearly a 1.4% 
increase in productivity, and both sources contributed equally (efficiency change 0.7% and 
technology 0.7%). This finding is interesting, given the fact that a significant number of new 
firms entered this category in mid 1990s and early 2000s as well as the mergers and acquisition of 
smaller firms with larger ones during this period. Public sector firms that were privatised 
subsequently in the late 1990s and early 2000s, on the other hand, recorded an impressive 7.5% 
growth in productivity per annum, as a result of technological improvement (5.1%) and 
efficiency improvement of 2.5%. This impressive performance should be treated cautiously, 
however, because there were only three firms this group. 
 
To further observe the initial impact of privatisation, we sub-divided the post privatisation period 
into two sub-periods: 1992-8 covering the initial impact and the more recent period of 1999 to 
2011. Overall, the industry as a whole and firms operating in the private sector did not 
experienced any significant growth in the initial years of the post privatisation period (see Table 
4). Firms privatised in 1991, however, experienced a productivity decline of 4% per annum 
during 1992-8 and a decline in efficiency was the main contributing factor. This initial negative 
impact of privatisation on productivity is similar to Brown et al. [21] estimates of the Russian 
manufacturing industry. 
 
Next we estimated Pearson’s correlation coefficient between productivity growth and a host of 
demand factors such as macroeconomic conditions, public finances (government being a large 
                                                                                                                                            
the post privatisation period. They concluded that the decline in productivity could have been due to significant capital 
investment in the post privatisation period to meet new tighter regulatory requirements. Privatised firms in our sample 
also made significant capital investment to upgrade technology of production and to add capacities. Hence, post 
privatisation better performance is even more commendable.  Post privatisation productivity improvement is 
consistent with Amess and Roberts [5]) growth of 3-20% per annum.    
31 Our rate of growth in technology is similar to Saal et al. [71]. 
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consumer of cement in the construction of roads, buildings, army cantonments, and 
infrastructure), business environment, external sector and firm/industry conditions. The results 
of this exercise are presented in Table 5. A negative coefficient would indicate a positive 
relationship between productivity (malm) and the relevant variable. This means that a value of 
productivity index of less than one and/or a negative value would indicate a positive change 
(growth) in productivity. 
         [Table 5 about here] 
 
Starting with firms and industry specific variables, we observe a negative correlation coefficient 
between firm age (old), exporter (volume of export) and a positive sign for industry competition 
(measured with the Herfindhal Index). Hence, older firms are more productive and an increase in 
exports as well as competition (less value of hhi_grsa) promotes productivity32. The macro 
economy (volume of GDP (gdp)) and manufacturing growth (manufac)) enhances productivity33. 
The same is true for investment (measured by gross fixed capital formation (gfcf), public 
investment (pubinv), and investment in government development projects (devexp)).  An 
increase in population (pop) creates more demand for housing and infrastructure and hence 
enhances productivity.  
 
                                                 
32A high value of HHI would indicate that the market is being monopolised by a few firms and therefore there is less 
incentive for existing firms to operate efficiently. Hence, a higher value of HHI would lead to a reduction in 
productivity. Nickell [60] suggested that based on theoretical underpinning, an increase in competition would lead to 
an increase in productivity due to better corporate governance. Asaftei et al. [7] investigating the role of competition 
concluded that privatised firms operating in competitive industries experienced significant growth in the post 
privatisation period as compared to those firms working in a less competitive environment. Hence, institutional change 
rather than change of ownership would encourage firms to become efficient and productive. Our positive relation of 
productivity and exports sales are similar to Saygili and Taymaz [73]. Chirwa [25] also concluded that HHI is negatively 
correlated with efficiency. 
33 Our positive relation of productivity improvement and economic growth is similar to Saygili and Taymaz [73]. 
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The external sector performance in terms of the exchange rate (exchr) and foreign remittances 
(remit) also contributes to productivity. Depreciation of the Pakistani Rupee (Pak. Rs.) 
encourages exports and productivity, whilst rising remittances generate more demand for cement. 
A negative coefficient for our main interest variable (dummy variable equal to one for period 
1992 onward) indicates that productivity has been rising since 1992 compared to the pre- 
privatisation period. Political stability (politics) measured through the number of years since a 
government was in power is correlated negatively with productivity indicating political stability 
promotes productivity.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The estimation of efficiency of firms has been a growing area of research to examine the effect of 
deregulation and privatisation since the late 1980s and mid 1990s. The fast convergence and 
flexibility to carry out statistical inferences has made a parametric estimator such as the stochastic 
frontier immensely popular amongst researchers. However, the a priori assumption of functional 
form makes the estimator somewhat less satisfactory. The DEA based non-parametric estimator 
is able to address some of the issues inherent in the parametric estimator. Frequent use of this 
estimator is mainly due to its flexibility and the fact that the estimator follows the logic of “data 
speaks for itself”. This flexibility is, arguably, an inherent flaw.  Recently, theoretical studies have 
shown that the convexity property of the DEA estimator and small sample issues make this 
estimator less robust. This casts serious doubts on the conclusions drawn from studies on the 
impact of deregulation and privatization that used the non-parametric DEA frontier.  
 
New estimators based on the idea of a partial frontier such as order-m and conditional -quantile 
that address the issue of the convex envelope and are robust to outlier and dimension issues 
(such as in our case) have recently been developed. This study uses recently developed robust 
non-parametric unconditional -quantile estimator of Wheelock and Wilson [89, 90] to estimate 
the level of technical efficiency and productivity in the Pakistani cement industry. This study 
covers at least four-five business cycles and the tenure of various governments. The estimates of 
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the efficiency and productivity in this paper are robust in respect to outliers and the problem of 
dimension. One of the limitations of our study is that the number of observations for each year 
and the population of firms is comparatively low. Hence our estimates of efficiency and 
productivity may be less precise but nonetheless, these estimates shed light on the effect of 
deregulation/privatisation on efficiency and productivity.  
 
We conclude that the Pakistani cement industry had experienced improvements in productivity in 
the post reform period across all its ownerships categories. However, we are unable to say the 
same for efficiency improvements. The improvement in productivity was achieved due to 
technological growth. The productivity improvement during 1999 to 2007 was more pronounced 
due to an enhanced macroeconomic environment, which leads us to conclude that rather than 
just a change of ownership, the enabling environment is extremely important. We also identified 
a greater degree of heterogeneity in the efficiency levels across three ownership categories that 
persisted throughout the sample period.  
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Table 1: Summary of Empirical Studies on Change of Ownership and Firms Performance 
since 2000 
Authors  Period Industry Country Method Post-privatization/deregulation 
Results 
Saal  and 
Parker [70] 
1985-99 Utility: water and 
sewerage 
UK Parametric Productivity did not improve 
Rossi [67] 1993-97 Utility: gas 
distribution  
Argentina Parametric Efficiency improved 
Chirwa [25] 1970-97 Manufacturing Malawi Non-
parametric 
Higher technical efficiency 
Saygili and 
Taymaz [73] 
1980-95 Manufacturing Turkey Parametric No change in efficiency 
Estache et al. 
[38] 
1994-99 Transport: railways Argentina & 
Brazil 
Non-
parametric 
Improvement in productivity 
Jones and 
Mygind [50] 
1993-97 Manufacturing Estonia  Parametric Efficiency and productivity improved 
Resende and 
Faceanha [64] 
1998-99 Utility: 
telecommunication 
Brazil Non-
parametric 
No improvement in efficiency 
Cullinane and 
Song [30] 
1978-96 Transport: 
container terminal 
Korea  Parametric Privatization improved container 
productive efficiency 
Li and Xu [51] 1990-
2001 
Utility: 
telecommunication 
Worldwide Parametric Improved total factor productivity 
Chirwa [26] 1970-97 Manufacturing Malawi  Parametric High technical efficiency in privatized, 
state and private companies 
 Bartel and 
Harrison [11] 
1981-95 Manufacturing Indonesia Parametric Public emperies perform worse than 
their private-sector counterparts 
Tongzon and 
Heng [85] 
2004 Transport: 
container ports   
Worldwide Parametric Private participation improved port 
operation efficiency  
Cullinane et 
al.[31] 
1992-99  Transport: 
container ports 
Worldwide Non-
parametric  
Private participation does not 
improve port efficiency 
Brown et al. 
[21] 
1994-
2002 
Manufacturing Romania, 
Hungry, 
Ukraine, 
Russia 
Parametric Positive effect of privatization on 
productivity 
Okten and 
Arin [61] 
1983-99  Manufacturing Turkey Parametric  Improved labor productivity 
Amess and 
Roberts [5] 
1988-93 Manufacturing Poland Parametric Improved productivity 
Saal et al. [71] 1985-
2000 
Utility: water and 
sewerage 
English and 
Welsh 
Parametric No improvement in productivity 
Asaftei et al. 
[7] 
1995-
2003 
Manufacturing Romania Parametric Did not perform any better than 
public enterprise 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Inputs and Output 
 Variable Scale N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Output Millions Rs. 407 2859.45 3209.53 16.59 24038.63 
Capital Millions Rs. 407 2535.85 2904.94 14.38 15140.4 
Labour Number 407 716.51 412.05 110 2550 
Material Millions Rs. 407 231.24 167.56 2.49 1142.25 
Fuel Millions Rs. 407 735 582.82 8.46 4669.1 
 
Table 3: Pakistani Cement Industry: Technical Efficiency Estimates 
Years FDHi FDHo DEAi DEAo DEAh ORDERMi ORDERMo α-
QUANTi 
α-
QUANTo 
α- 
QUANTh 
Pre-Reforms Period 
1986-91 1.0007 0.9998 1.0338 0.9676 1.0167 0.7692 1.4292 0.7096 0.9998 0.5685 
Post-Reforms Periods 
1992-11 1.0063 0.9927 1.0626 0.9351 1.0329 0.7688 1.2209 0.7947 1.0245 0.7091 
1992-98 1.0053 0.9853 1.0889 0.9193 1.0451 0.7746 1.2961 0.7275 0.9895 0.6371 
1999-11 1.0068 0.9967 1.0488 0.9436 1.0264 0.7658 1.1823 0.8334 1.0438 0.7512 
1999-06 1.0106 0.9949 1.0544 0.9396 1.0291 0.7816 1.1030 0.8523 1.0011 0.7781 
2007-11 1.0009 0.9996 1.0398 0.9500 1.0221 0.7411 1.3212 0.8041 1.1160 0.7101 
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Table 4: Total Factor Productivity Estimates and its Components by Ownerships (Hyperbolic α-quantile estimator, α = 0.9) 
 Industry Privatized-1991 Private Public 
 Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
1987 1.072 1.049 1.023 1.181 1.275 0.926 1.180 0.985 1.198 1.054 1.061 0.994 
1988 0.955 0.958 0.997 0.935 0.942 0.992 0.990 1.004 0.986 0.946 0.946 1.000 
1989 1.029 1.025 1.004 1.043 1.010 1.033 1.019 1.024 0.995 1.032 1.025 1.006 
1990 1.046 1.031 1.015 1.007 0.988 1.020 1.262 1.266 0.997 0.994 0.975 1.020 
1991 1.002 0.969 1.035 1.014 0.991 1.023 1.064 0.927 1.148 0.986 0.980 1.006 
1992 0.979 1.016 0.963 1.070 1.127 0.950 0.897 0.922 0.972 0.921 0.947 0.973 
1993 1.017 1.035 0.982 1.037 1.069 0.970 1.110 1.122 0.989 0.911 0.945 0.965 
1994 0.978 1.025 0.954 1.032 1.035 0.998 0.970 1.061 0.914 0.894 0.995 0.898 
1995 1.018 0.972 1.048 1.020 0.971 1.051 0.918 0.961 0.955 1.137 0.956 1.190 
1996 0.998 0.949 1.052 1.031 0.998 1.034 1.092 0.850 1.286 0.852 0.941 0.906 
1997 1.009 1.011 0.998 1.043 0.993 1.051 1.028 1.039 0.989 0.918 0.991 0.927 
1998 0.991 1.002 0.989 1.044 1.082 0.965 1.015 1.001 1.014 0.923 0.946 0.975 
1999 0.939 1.000 0.939 0.922 1.099 0.839 0.968 0.974 0.995 1.010 1.016 0.994 
2000 0.982 1.045 0.940 0.911 0.991 0.919 1.029 1.080 0.953 0.837 0.923 0.907 
2001 0.970 0.984 0.986 0.930 0.894 1.041 1.032 1.055 0.978 0.774 0.901 0.860 
2002 0.989 1.047 0.945 1.006 1.073 0.938 0.961 1.007 0.955 1.054 1.200 0.879 
2003 0.940 0.947 0.993 1.029 1.053 0.978 0.947 0.923 1.026    
2004 0.976 1.034 0.944 1.035 1.076 0.962 0.937 1.009 0.928    
2005 1.033 0.974 1.061 1.020 0.957 1.065 1.035 0.962 1.076    
2006 0.996 0.954 1.044 0.986 0.952 1.035 1.006 1.002 1.004    
2007 1.146 1.064 1.077 1.006 0.976 1.031 1.070 0.943 1.135    
2008 0.870 1.005 0.866 0.884 1.061 0.833 0.840 0.934 0.899    
2009 0.944 0.937 1.007 0.934 0.928 1.006 0.943 0.969 0.973    
2010 0.935 0.893 1.047 0.847 0.790 1.071 1.033 1.010 1.023    
2011 0.905 1.030 0.878 0.931 1.057 0.881 0.925 1.072 0.862    
1986-1991 1.020 1.006 1.014 1.033 1.035 0.998 1.098 1.035 1.061 1.002 0.997 1.005 
1992-2011 0.979 0.995 0.984 0.984 1.006 0.978 0.986 0.993 0.993 0.925 0.975 0.949 
1992-2011
a
 0.971 0.992 0.979 0.983 1.007 0.976 0.981 0.996 0.986    
1992-1998 0.998 1.001 0.997 1.040 1.038 1.002 1.002 0.990 1.011 0.933 0.960 0.972 
1999-2011
a
 0.956 0.986 0.969 0.951 0.990 0.961 0.970 0.999 0.971    
Notes: a. excluding 2007. 
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Table 5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients   
 malm old export hhi_grsa gdp manufac gfcf pubinv devexp pop exchr remit post92 politics 
malm 1.000              
old -0.043 1.000             
export -0.036 0.059 1.000            
hhi_grsa 0.002 0.190 0.466 1.000           
gdp -0.072 0.333 0.525 0.736 1.000          
manufac -0.027 0.353 0.456 0.647 0.922 1.000         
gfcf -0.040 0.345 0.501 0.721 0.956 0.982 1.000        
pubinv -0.053 0.338 0.526 0.766 0.974 0.947 0.983 1.000       
devexp -0.028 0.332 0.516 0.783 0.951 0.959 0.986 0.980 1.000      
pop -0.065 0.363 0.406 0.448 0.888 0.930 0.906 0.889 0.851 1.000     
exchr -0.090 0.348 0.435 0.472 0.912 0.893 0.896 0.897 0.839 0.978 1.000    
remit -0.049 0.308 0.530 0.807 0.947 0.890 0.925 0.924 0.943 0.776 0.791 1.000   
post92 -0.056 0.246 0.144 -0.036 0.430 0.509 0.454 0.467 0.393 0.699 0.637 0.248 1.000  
politics -0.052 0.188 0.108 -0.016 0.415 0.492 0.403 0.312 0.352 0.509 0.476 0.410 0.315 1.000 
Notes: Variables explanation 
malm      : Malmquist productivity index 
old           : Firm age (in years) 
export     : Export sale (in millions Pak Rupees (Rs.)) 
hhi_grsa : Herfindhal Index (a proxy for competition based on gross sales of each firm) 
gdp          : Volume of gross domestic product (Rs. billions) 
manufac : Manufacturing production index (base=100) 
gfcf          : Gross fixed capital formation (Pak. Rs. Millions) 
pubinv    : Public investment (Pak. Rs. Millions) 
devexp    : Government development expenditure (Pak. Rs. Millions) 
pop          : Population (Millions)   
exchr       : Exchange rate (Pak. Rs./$) 
remit       : Foreign remittances (millions US$) 
post92    : Dummy variable =1 for post privatisation/deregulation period (1992 onward), 0 otherwise  
politics    : Political stability variable calculated as number of years a government was in power. More means political stability  
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Figure 1: Structure of the Cement Industry  
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Notes: 
hhi_grsa  : Total gross sales Herfindhal Index   
hhi_assets: Total assets Herfindhal Index 
hhi_acpr :  Actual production capacity Herfindhal Index 
 
Figure 2: Unconditional Hyperbolic α-Quantile Efficiency Estimates and Variance 
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Figure 3: Unconditional Hyperbolic α-Quantile Efficiency Estimates by Ownerships 
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Appendix-A Sensitivity of Technical Efficiency Estimates 
 α-QUANTh α-QUANTh α-QUANTh ORDERMi ORDERMo 
Period α=0.80 α=0.85 α=0.87 m=4 m=4 
1986 0.413 0.525 0.525 0.692 1.612 
1987 0.518 0.518 0.586 0.720 1.779 
1988 0.506 0.506 0.561 0.709 1.832 
1989 0.520 0.520 0.575 0.716 1.840 
1990 0.513 0.513 0.593 0.737 1.903 
1991 0.512 0.512 0.575 0.754 2.110 
1992 0.454 0.503 0.563 0.720 2.495 
1993 0.477 0.525 0.582 0.730 1.714 
1994 0.511 0.554 0.597 0.735 1.834 
1995 0.499 0.499 0.565 0.720 1.942 
1996 0.619 0.648 0.648 0.757 1.123 
1997 0.594 0.632 0.632 0.755 1.142 
1998 0.573 0.624 0.624 0.741 1.204 
1999 0.589 0.631 0.631 0.735 1.206 
2000 0.626 0.673 0.673 0.738 1.144 
2001 0.618 0.666 0.666 0.728 1.124 
2002 0.628 0.709 0.709 0.748 1.106 
2003 0.584 0.681 0.681 0.721 1.128 
2004 0.639 0.683 0.683 0.769 1.116 
2005 0.579 0.656 0.656 0.741 1.136 
2006 0.560 0.620 0.620 0.732 1.172 
2007 0.525 0.612 0.612 0.712 1.417 
2008 0.542 0.597 0.597 0.697 1.527 
2009 0.517 0.592 0.592 0.677 1.426 
2010 0.474 0.534 0.534 0.665 1.482 
2011 0.609 0.609 0.717 0.743 1.296 
1986-91 0.496 0.516 0.569 0.721 1.840 
1992-11 0.558 0.609 0.627 0.728 1.349 
1992-98 0.529 0.566 0.601 0.737 1.570 
1999-11 0.574 0.634 0.642 0.723 1.244 
1999-06 0.602 0.664 0.664 0.739 1.141 
2007-11 0.532 0.588 0.608 0.698 1.428 
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Appendix B Sensitivity of Total Factor Productivity Estimates and its Components by Ownerships (α = 0.8) 
 Industry Privatized-1991 Private Public 
 Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 
Productivity 
change 
Efficiency 
change 
Technical 
change 1987 1.141 1.151 0.991 1.229 1.305 0.942 1.436 1.236 1.162 1.094 1.136 0.963 
1988 0.960 0.976 0.984 0.937 0.969 0.967 1.021 1.007 1.014 0.944 0.967 0.975 
1989 1.021 1.028 0.993 1.045 1.041 1.004 1.019 1.043 0.977 1.022 1.024 0.998 
1990 1.052 0.987 1.066 1.004 0.936 1.074 1.250 1.123 1.114 1.004 0.953 1.054 
1991 1.006 0.997 1.009 0.986 0.993 0.992 1.097 1.067 1.028 0.982 0.978 1.004 
1992 0.980 1.021 0.960 1.066 1.106 0.964 0.906 0.950 0.954 0.928 0.948 0.979 
1993 1.027 1.051 0.977 1.038 1.075 0.965 1.097 1.121 0.979 0.964 0.973 0.990 
1994 1.008 1.071 0.941 1.096 1.135 0.965 1.015 1.025 0.990 0.893 1.077 0.829 
1995 0.999 0.930 1.074 0.986 0.879 1.121 0.929 0.996 0.932 1.142 0.943 1.212 
1996 0.996 0.966 1.032 1.053 1.062 0.991 1.070 0.871 1.228 0.832 0.877 0.948 
1997 0.972 0.985 0.987 0.964 0.971 0.993 0.982 0.952 1.032 0.960 1.034 0.928 
1998 1.000 0.966 1.036 0.998 0.971 1.028 1.056 1.023 1.033 0.894 0.842 1.062 
1999 0.953 1.022 0.933 0.911 1.064 0.857 1.025 1.034 0.992 1.019 1.098 0.928 
2000 0.979 1.064 0.920 0.865 0.984 0.879 1.038 1.133 0.916 0.902 0.926 0.974 
2001 0.953 0.959 0.993 1.010 0.998 1.012 0.986 0.943 1.046 0.770 0.984 0.782 
2002 0.976 0.980 0.996 0.931 0.914 1.019 0.993 1.076 0.923 1.001 0.760 1.317 
2003 0.929 0.926 1.004 0.979 0.982 0.997 0.936 0.907 1.032    
2004 0.963 1.012 0.952 1.067 1.121 0.952 0.899 0.940 0.957    
2005 0.979 0.945 1.036 0.968 0.867 1.115 0.984 0.987 0.997    
2006 0.978 0.968 1.011 0.992 0.997 0.995 0.964 0.937 1.028    
2007 1.074 0.919 1.169 0.947 0.833 1.138 1.009 0.849 1.189    
2008 0.867 1.014 0.854 0.881 0.993 0.888 0.846 1.006 0.841    
2009 0.982 0.927 1.059 1.068 0.870 1.228 0.967 0.961 1.006    
2010 0.938 0.922 1.017 0.929 0.920 1.009 0.991 1.000 0.991    
2011 0.918 1.052 0.873 0.956 1.069 0.895 0.919 1.059 0.868    
1986-1991 1.034 1.026 1.008 1.036 1.041 0.995 1.154 1.092 1.057 1.008 1.010 0.998 
1992-2011 0.973 0.984 0.989 0.983 0.987 0.997 0.979 0.986 0.993 0.932 0.946 0.985 
1992-2011
a
 0.968 0.987 0.980 0.985 0.996 0.990 0.977 0.994 0.984    
1992-1998 0.998 0.997 1.000 1.028 1.025 1.003 1.006 0.988 1.017 0.941 0.953 0.987 
1999-2011
a
 0.951 0.981 0.969 0.961 0.979 0.982 0.961 0.997 0.964    
Notes: a. excluding 2007 
